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Using data from labour force surveys conducted simultaneously in the
capital cities of seven WAEMU countries, we estimate a model of residen-
tial location choice in which expected earnings play a role. The model is
ﬁrst estimated in a reduced form. Estimates are then used to correct for
the endogeneity of locational choice in the earnings equations estimated
for each country. We ﬁnd that migration behaviour has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
in shaping earnings diﬀerentials between education levels and between the
seven capital cities. Corrected predicted earnings in each country are then
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in which their expected earnings are higher than elsewhere.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Migration from and to African countries is an extensive phenomenon. Accord-
ing to recent estimates by the United Nations Population Division, the total
number of international migrants in Africa rose from nine millions in 1960 to
16 millions in 2000. West Africa in particular has a long history of population
mobility, both regionally and internationally. Linked with factors as diverse as
long-distance trade, plantation agriculture, urbanisation but also armed con-
ﬂict, land degradation, drought, etc., migration in the region played and still
plays a major part in shaping settlement patterns. At a political level, several
initiatives have facilitated labor migration, among which the free movement of
persons institutionalized by the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS).
With this background in mind, the purpose of this paper is to examine
the locational choice of a large sample of Africans originating from the West
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). Historically, in the economic
literature the concern with migration emerged with the work of Sjaastad (1962).
In the development literature, however, Todaro (1969) and Harris & Todaro
(1970) are the ﬁrst to present a model in which the decision to migrate results
from the rational comparison of the expected costs and beneﬁts of migration.In both models, the diﬀerence in average expected earnings between countries
or regions of destination and countries or regions of origin plays a key role
and is predicted to have a positive eﬀect on migration ﬂows. However this
kind of model is unable to explain key stylized facts, such as migration ﬂows
from and to particular regions or countries. For instance, in Africa, a sizable
number of people living in Benin come from Togo and an equally sizable number
of people residing in Togo are natives from Benin. Borjas (1987) and, more
recently, Dahl (2002) have adopted a rather diﬀerent approach, based on the
seminal paper of Roy (1951). In Roy’s framework, workers select themselves in
income earning activities on the basis of their comparative advantage. Applied
to residential choice, this model explains migration not by average expected
earning diﬀerentials, but rather by diﬀerences in individual expected returns
to skills that are either observed or unobserved by the econometrician. As a
result migration ﬂows are not necessarily one-sided. Another conclusion of this
literature is that migrants’ self selection should be taken into account when
estimating the returns to human capital in countries where the ﬂow of migrants
is signiﬁcant. Dahl (2002) for instance, in a study of migration between states
of the USA, estimates a Roy model and ﬁnds that correcting for selection bias
substantially changes the estimated returns to education in a sense that supports
the role of comparative advantage in mobility decisions. He also ﬁnds that
migration ﬂows depend positively on the diﬀerences in the corrected returns to
education.
Estimation of this kind of model is usually very diﬃcult due to the im-
possibility to gather data on the origin and destination labour markets at the
same time. In this paper we use a unique collection of data originating fromthe PARSTAT project sponsored by the WAEMU.1 Representative household
quantitative surveys have been conducted simultaneously in the capital cities
of seven member States of the WAEMU (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar,
Lome, Ouagadougou and Niamey) in 2001-2002. The surveys provide detailed
information for all individuals aged 10 or more within each sample household,
relating to education and training, employment, unemployment and earnings.
Furthermore, data on country of birth and last country of residence allow to
identify international migrants within each national sample.
Our purpose in the paper is threefold. First, we ﬁll a gap in the knowledge
of cross-border migrations within Africa, using our sample data to compare the
characteristics of migrants with those of non migrants in their countries of origin
and destination. Although the overall picture is drawn using data on capital
cities only, some interesting features emerge. Second, we want to evaluate the
extent of the bias in the estimated returns to education, when international
migration is not accounted for. Third, we want to determine whether or not
earnings diﬀerentials matter in the choice of the country of residence. In the
model that follows we assume that individuals are born randomly in one of the
seven countries under review, but then rationally choose the country in which
they reside by comparing the utilities associated with each choice. Estimation
of this model provides unbiased estimates of the returns to education, together
with the eﬀect of expected earnings diﬀerentials on the probability of choosing
one particular country. Given the data at hand, the universe of destination
countries is restricted to those countries that are quite close to each other in
1The PARSTAT project was coordinated by AFRISTAT, under the scientiﬁc supervision of
Alain Brilleau (DIAL-INSEE), Eloi Ouedraogo (AFRISTAT) and François Roubaud (DIAL-
IRD). See Amegashie, Brilleau, Coulibaly, Koriko, Ouedraogo, Roubaud & Torelli (2005) for
details on the project and Brilleau, Roubaud & Torelli (2005) for extensive descriptive results.terms of geographical, legal, cultural and economic distance. They share the
same language, have a common currency and, most importantly, they all be-
long to the WAEMU region within which people are free to move and settle.
While this restriction is regrettable and constitutes a clear limitation of our
study, it does nevertheless make sense to analyse migrants’ choice of destination
in the West African context where there are no legal barriers to migrate and
where most international migration takes place intra-regionally. We ﬁnd that
migration behaviour plays an important role in determining earnings diﬀeren-
tials between countries and between individuals with diﬀerent education levels.
Moreover, our results suggest that earnings diﬀerentials matter in locational
choice.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 Overview of migration patterns within the West African
region.
Movements of labour in Sub-Saharan Africa are not a new phenomenon. Over
the generations people have migrated in response to demographic, economic,
political and other related factors, such as population pressure, environmental
disasters, poverty and conﬂicts. In pre-colonial West Africa, migrations were
generally circular, seasonal and of short duration, and occurred largely from
unsecure or drought-prone regions to more secure and fertile regions (Adepoju
2005). Colonialism signiﬁcantly altered the motivation and migration patterns
in this region by introducing far reaching structural changes. In particular, the
development of transportation systems, the monetization of the economy andthe deliberate development of mining enclaves and plantation agriculture to-
gether with a series of recruitment policies (compulsory recruitment, contract
and forced labour legislation and agreements) stimulated regional labour migra-
tion from Mali, Togo and Upper Volta to Gold Coast and Côte d’Ivoire (Adepoju
2005, Adebusoye 2006). These socio-economic and historical factors have shaped
contemporary patterns of migration between African countries. However, with
the end of colonialism and largely in response to growing disparities in living
standards, inter-continental migration in the direction of Northern developed
countries has been a growing phenomenon for the last fourty years.
Despite their importance, yet little is known about these migrations. The in-
formation provided by census data, immigration and emigration statistics and a
small number of ad hoc surveys on the number, identity and motivations of both
inter- and intra-continental African migrants is indeed far from being complete
and reliable. In particular, estimates on the number of African international
migrants widely diﬀer between sources: they range from about 16 millions ac-
cording to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 2003) to 50
millions according to the African Union (AU, 2005). Evidence is even more
scarce concerning trans-border migrations within the West African sub-region.
How many trans-border migrants are there in each West-African country? Who
are these migrants? What are their main motivations? Here are some of the
questions we want to address in this paper.
2.2 Data sources
Our data come from representative household quantitative surveys (the 1-2-3
Surveys on Employment, Informal Sector, Consumption and Poverty) conductedsimultaneously in the capital cities of Benin (Cotonou), Burkina Faso (Oua-
gadougou), Cote d’Ivoire (Abidjan), Mali (Bamako), Niger (Niamey), Senegal
(Dakar) and Togo (Lome) in 2001-2002 (see Appendix for details on the sam-
pling frame). These countries are all members of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS).2 The creation of ECOWAS, in 1975, responded
to the recognition by West African leaders that intra-regional integration could
be an important step towards the region’s collective integration into the global
economy. The key objective of the Community was thus to remove obstacles
to the free movement of goods, capital and people in the sub-region. In line
with this objective, the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right
of Residence and Establishment was signed in May 1979. A transition period
followed, during which the rights of entry (in 1980) and residence (in 1986)
were established. More recently, in 2000, members of the ECOWAS agreed to
introduce a new passport for citizens of the sub-region that will progressively
replace national passports. Even though much remains to be done in order to
achieve a complete liberalization of labour migration within the community -
some countries are still restricting foreigners, including community nationals,
from participating in certain kinds of economic activities - all these measures
taken to create a borderless West Africa provide a good opportunity to study
the residential choice of people within the community. Moreover, amongst the
ECOWAS members, the countries of our sample are all French-speaking coun-
tries and are all members of another community, namely the West African Eco-
2ECOWAS groups 15 countries: 5 English speaking countries (Gambia, Ghana, Liberia,
Nigeria, Sierra Leone), 8 French speaking countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory
Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo) and 2 countries sharing Portuguese as their oﬃcial language
(Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde).nomic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).3 As such they share the CFA franc
as a common currency. These common features undoubtedly facilitate labour
migration.
Implemented by National Statistical Institutes in conjunction with AFRI-
STAT and the IRD Research Unit DIAL, the 1-2-3 Surveys provide detailed
information for all individuals aged 10 or more within each sample household
relating to education and training, employment, unemployment and earnings.
Furthermore, data on country of birth and last country of residence allow us to
identify migrants within each national sample. More details on the survey can
be found in Amegashie et al. (2005).
2.3 Descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Numbers of migrants
Table 1 reports the composition of each national sample. For ease of compu-
tation, we consider as migrants all individuals who meet the following three
criteria: (i) they are not citizens of the country they reside in; (ii) they were
not born in the capital city of the country they reside in; and (iii) they have
not been residing continuously in the capital city since they were born. In-
dividuals who are not migrants are considered as natives. In the empirical
analysis that follows, we restrict the sample to all active individuals aged be-
3Created in 1994, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) is com-
posed of eight member States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali,
Niger, Senegal and Togo. Some of the principal objectives of WAEMU are to: (i) strengthen
competitiveness of the economic and ﬁnancial activities of the member States within the
context of a free and competitive common market and a rationalised and harmonised legal
environment; (ii) achieve convergence of the performance and economic policies of the mem-
ber countries; and (iii) create a common market among the member countries based on free
movement of persons, goods, services, and capital and the right of establishment of persons
engaged in an independent or salaried employment, and on a common external tariﬀ and trade
policy.tween 15 and 65, originating from one of the seven countries covered by the
1-2-3 survey and residing in the capital city of one of these countries either as
natives or as immigrants. To avoid confusion, all individuals included in the
sample appear in bold in Table 1. As suggested by the ﬁgures, there is a wide
variety of migration conﬁgurations within the WAEMU. Figures ﬁrst suggest
that despite the severe sociopolitical crisis that started in 1999 with a military
coup d’Etat which has resulted in reverse ﬂows of migrants, Cote d’Ivoire is
still, by far, the most important immigration country in the WAEMU region.4
Extrapolation from the Ivorian sample reveals that 15.9 per cent of Abidjan’s
inhabitants aged 16 or more are immigrants among which 74 per cent are citi-
zens of a WAEMU country (see Table 2 for extrapolated ﬁgures). Even though
migration ﬂows from Burkina Faso and Mali have been ﬂuctuating since the be-
ginning of the crisis, these two neighboring countries remain the main providers
of migrants to Cote d’Ivoire. By contrast, immigrants from bordering WAEMU
countries only account for a marginal share of the population in Dakar, the
capital city of Senegal. Extrapolated ﬁgures suggest indeed that less than 2
per cent of Dakar’s inhabitants are non-Senegalese, among which a large share
comes either from Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Gambia, Mauritania or Mali. Last,
a quick comparison of row and column totals by country suggests that Malian
and Burkinabe expatriates residing in the capital city of a WAEMU country
largely outnumber the expatriates from WAEMU countries residing in Bamako
or Ouagadougou, suggesting that Mali and Burkina Faso have been and still are
major labour-exporting countries. Benin, Niger and Togo, by contrast, combine
both emigration and immigration. The question of the representativeness of our
4The civil war in Côte d’Ivoire started in september 2002, a few months after the completion
of the 1-2-3 survey.samples needs to be raised, though. It is indeed likely that our migrants’ sam-
ples are not representative of the whole population of migrants since we miss
all those individuals who moved out of their country to settle in a rural area of
another WAEMU country. Those migrants might strongly diﬀer from the ones
recorded in our samples, especially with regards to their distribution by country
of origin. The share of Togolese among immigrants in Benin, for example, may
not be as high as the share of Togolese among immigrants in Cotonou. Or the
share of immigrants in Burkina Faso may not be as small as the share of immi-
grants in Ouagadougou. To complete the picture and compare our ﬁgures with
those computed at the country level, Table 3 reports statistics on immigrants
by country of origin in each one of the seven WAEMU countries under concern,
using census data. Overall, the same general migration patterns emerge: na-
tional data conﬁrm the position of Cote d’Ivoire as the main labor-importing
country of the region, with most migrants coming from Mali or Burkina Faso;
they conﬁrm the marginal participation of Senegal in intra-regional migration
ﬂows; and they ﬁnally conﬁrm that Benin, Niger and Togo both import and
export labour. The picture for Burkina Faso, however, strongly diﬀers from the
one we drew using data on Ouagadougou only. Rural Burkina Faso is indeed
found to host a fairly high number of Malian migrants who are not accounted
for in our urban sample. Our inference for Burkina Faso using data on Oua-
gadougou only should thus certainly be considered with caution. Another issue
relating to the representativeness of our samples relates to the fact that immi-
grants are a relatively small share of the population and may cluster in some
given areas. Given the sampling frame of the PARSTAT surveys, it is possible
that such areas were missed when the census sectors were selected in the ﬁrststage. Although this possibility cannot be totally ruled out in some cities, we
believe in the representativeness of our samples in the cases of Lome, Abidjan
and Bamako. In the case of Lome indeed, since 125 census sectors were selected
out of 129, the probability that we missed clusters of migrants is quite low. In
the two other cases, our estimates on immigration rate at the level of the city
and on the composition of migrants’ stocks by country of origin are quite similar
to the ones obtained using census data. In addition, we used our representative
samples of census sectors in each capital city to test the null hypothesis of ran-
dom allocation of migrants across neighbourhoods and could reject it in none
of our samples.
2.3.2 Migrants’ main characteristics
Table 4 provides some descriptive statistics on the main characteristics of natives
and immigrants by country of residence. Figures ﬁrst suggest that compared to
natives, females are under-represented in the immigrant population of Oua-
gadougou, Abidjan and Lome while they are slightly over-represented in that
of Cotonou and Niamey. Traditional male-dominated short-to-long distance
migratory streams in West Africa are thus increasingly feminised, suggesting
a turn-around in traditional sex roles. Second, no clear pattern emerges with
regard to age. Immigrants are signiﬁcantly older on average than natives in
Abidjan, Niamey and Lome but are roughly of the same age in all the other
capital cities. Third, immigrants appear to be less educated on average than
natives in four capital cities out of seven (Cotonou, Abidjan, Niamey and Lome).
As a result, the percentage of non graduate individuals among immigrants in
these four cities is much higher than among natives. The education gap is par-ticularly pronounced in Abidjan where immigrants have two years of schooling
on average against 6.6 for natives. In reading Table 4, however, one should not
forget that statistics for natives are computed using data collected in capital
cities only. Some of them are thus likely to be bad proxies for the situation pre-
vailing at the national level (mean education levels, for example, are generally
much higher in urban areas than in rural ones). It should consequently come
as no surprise that immigrants in Cotonou, Abidjan, Niamey and Lome (a ma-
jority of which might come from rural areas) are on average less educated than
Beninois in Cotonou, Ivorians in Abidjan, Nigeriens in Niamey and Togolese
in Lome. The cases of Bamako, Ouagadougou and Dakar, where immigrants
appear to be more educated on average than natives, suggest that those capital
cities mainly attract educated people (this could be the case for Dakar) and/or
people coming from urban areas. Due to small sample size, however, the ﬁgure
for Dakar should be taken with caution.5
As a complement to Table 4, Table 5 provides some descriptive statistics on
the main characteristics of non-migrant natives and emigrants, or “stayers” and
“movers”, by WAEMU country. In most countries, males are over-represented
in the emigrant population except in Togo and, to a lesser extent, in Benin.
Intra-regional migratory ﬂows from these two countries are mostly motivated
by commercial purposes and have traditionally been female-dominated. In terms
of education, emigrants appear much less educated than non-migrant natives in
all countries, suggesting that migration ﬂows within the WAEMU region mainly
concern low-qualiﬁed workers.
5People may have migrated to Dakar to get educated, so that the decision to reside in
Dakar may be an endogenous one with respect to education. Our sample of immigrants in
Senegal, however, is only composed of individuals who arrived in Dakar after the age of 25.
It is thus likely that the choice of residing in Dakar was made after ﬁnal graduation.To further learn on migration patterns within the WAEMU region, Tables
6a, 6b and 6c provide more disaggregated ﬁgures on the main characteristics of
migrants (in terms of education and gender) by origin and destination countries.
Interesting features emerge. First, whatever their country of origin, immigrants
in Abidjan and, to a lesser extent, in Niamey are much less educated on average
than their nonmigrant compatriots or than their compatriots who migrated to
some other West African countries. As an illustration, Nigeriens in Abidjan
have only one year of schooling on average while Nigeriens in Niamey, Cotonou
and Lome have respectively 5.0, 2.6 and 3.1 years of schooling; Burkinabe in
Abidjan have 1.5 year of education on average while Burkinabe in Bamako,
Niamey and Lome have respectively 4.6, 2.6 and 3.8 years of schooling; etc.
Abidjan is thus found to attract the least educated among the migrants (Table
6a). The education gap between movers and stayers could be due to age cohort
eﬀects, however. To test for the existence of such eﬀects, we run separate
regressions (one per country) in which the level of education is explained by
a set of variables including age, sex, religion, father’s education and migration
status. Migration status is either non-signiﬁcant or with a negative sign in
all regressions, bringing support to the idea that migrants are less educated on
average than non-movers in both host and origin countries, even after controlling
for their age. Another interesting feature is related to the sex composition of
immigrant populations (Table 6b). Here again, Abidjan stands apart: whatever
their country of origin, immigrants in the capital city of Côte d’Ivoire are mostly
males. By contrast, the proportion of males is much lower on average among
their compatriots who migrated to another capital city. The cases of Togo and
Benin are very illustrative: Togolese and Beninois emigration to neighboringWAEMU countries is female-dominated except for Abidjan. To sum up, Abidjan
is found to attract low-educated males from everywhere in the region; both
Niamey and Cotonou attract low-educated females from Togo; Niamey also
attracts low-educated females from Cotonou; in the mean time, Nigeriens males
are sent to Lome and Cotonou.
2.3.3 Migrants’ employment status
To complete this overview, Table 7 provides descriptive statistics on the em-
ployment situation of natives and immigrants by country of residence. On
average, labour force participation is higher for immigrants than for natives.
The diﬀerence is particularly strong in the cases of Abidjan and Niamey, sug-
gesting that migration streams to these two capital cities are mainly motivated
by labour market considerations. Given the individual characteristics of immi-
grants, particularly with respect to their level of education, one would expect
their employment situation to be less favourable than that of natives in Coto-
nou, Abidjan, Niamey and Lome and more favourable in Dakar. In the context
of labour markets in developing economies, a favourable situation is that of for-
mal wage workers in the public or private sector, in contrast to the situation of
informal workers. Formal wage workers usually enjoy higher wages, more job
security and more beneﬁts than informal workers. Figures indicate that this is
indeed the case. The percentage of immigrants working in the informal sector
is much higher than that of natives in Cotonou, Abidjan, Bamako, Niamey and
Lome while it is lower in Dakar and in Ouagadougou. Average hourly earnings
roughly follow the same pattern. Compared to natives, immigrants are indeed
found to enjoy much lower hourly wages on average in Cotonou (-29%), Abidjan(-41%) and Niamey (-30%) while they enjoy much higher hourly wages in Dakar
(+91%), Lome (+33%) and Bamako (+67%). Figures for Dakar and Bamako
should however be considered with great care given small sample size. Lome
stands as an exception since its immigrants are less educated on average, are
more concentrated in the informal sector, but enjoy signiﬁcantly higher hourly
wages than natives.
3 Model speciﬁc a t i o na n de s t i m a t i o ns t r a t e g y
We study the locational choice of individuals originating from one of the seven
countries of the PARSTAT project. Given the data at hand, we do not aim at
estimating a complete model of locational choice covering the whole universe
of destination countries. We have a large sample of individuals who reside in
the capital city of a given WAEMU country and our objective is to investigate
whether they are rational to do so or not, at least from the point of view of their
monetary utility, i.e. whether residing in the capital city of another WAEMU
country would allow them to get higher earnings given their observed and unob-
served characteristics or not. Each individual has the choice to settle in any of
these seven countries. We assume that individuals behave as if they maximize a
stochastic utility function, where utility is a function of the distribution of earn-
ings in the chosen location. The question is whether diﬀerences in individual
speciﬁc mean earnings determine locational choice. The diﬃculty is that, since
we observe earnings at only one location for each individual, potential earnings
at other locations must be imputed and, in doing so, it is necessary to hold
account of the fact that location choice is not random, but partly commandedby earnings diﬀerences. Thus our estimation strategy proceeds in three steps.
In the ﬁrst step a multinomial logit model of locational choice is estimated using
a reduced form speciﬁcation. The results from this estimation are then used to
compute appropriate correction terms that are added as independent variables
in Mincer-type earnings equations. Results from this second step are then used
to identify the eﬀect of expected earnings diﬀerentials in locational choice.
We assume that individual i, born in country j, and living in country k has
a utility ui(j,k) given by :
ui(j,k)=α.lnyik + z0
iγk + vi(j,k) (1)
with lnyik the logarithm of the individual’s hourly earnings in country k and zi
a vector of individual characteristics. We assume that vi(j,k) is independent of
vi(j,l) for all k and l. An increase in labour market earnings provides identical
gains in utility, independently of the country of residence. This might be too
strong an assumption if large diﬀerences exist between countries in the set of
available goods and their price. For instance health services could be free of
charge in one country and very costly in another. This would impact on the
living standards of people with identical incomes but not living in the same
country. In the present case, the data we use come from very similar coun-
tries: all of them are former French colonies and they share a common currency.
Moreover, all surveyed individuals live in capital cities, between which diﬀer-
ences in markets are likely to be smaller than between urban and rural areas.
In addition to earnings, we assume that utilities are impacted by individual
characteristics, zi, with the size and sign of the impact depending upon the
country of residence. For instance, countries in the WAEMU largely diﬀer bytheir population’s religious composition: more than 90% of the population liv-
ing in Dakar (Senegal), Bamako (Mali) and Niamey (Niger) is muslim, against
about 10% in Lome (Togo) or Cotonou (Benin). Ceteris paribus, individuals
of a given confession might prefer to live in countries where this confession is
well represented. As a result, being a Muslim should have a positive impact on
utility for people living in Dakar, Bamako and Niamey, but a zero or even a
negative impact for people living in Lome or Cotonou.
Individual i decides to live in country k if this choice provides more utility
than living in any other country net of moving costs, that is:
ui(j,k) − c(j,k) ≥ ui(j,l) − c(j,l) for any l. (2)
where c(j,k) (respectively c(j,l)) is the cost of settling in country k (respectively
l)w h e nb o r ni nc o u n t r yj. These costs cannot be observed. In the econometric
estimation of the model we shall use nationality dummies in order to account
for them, assuming that individuals originating from the same country face the
same level of costs. Individual variations in the z variables will also help in
accounting for psychic and other non monetary costs.
We are particularly interested in estimating α in equation (1). Since lnyik
is only observed for individuals living in country k, estimation has to proceed
in several steps. First, we assume that each individual living in country k faces
a Mincer-type earnings equation:
lnyik = x0
ik.βk + uik (3)
where xik is a vector of individual characteristics such as sex, education orlabour market potential experience. Second, we substitute lnyik in equation (1)




where εi(j,k)=α.uik + vi(j,k).
Under the assumption that εi(j,k) has a generalized extreme value distrib-
ution, it can be shown that:






















with P the total number of locations and β
α
k = α.βk. This is known as the
multinomial logit model and is well documented in standard reference textbooks.
Results from this reduced form estimation can then be used to correct for
endogenous selection in the earnings equations. The multinomial logit suﬀers
from the Independance of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption, which in this case
is unlikely to hold. Indeed, since the error term, εi(j,k), is a composite of
equations (1) and (3) perturbations, one can expect cov(εi(j,k),εi(j,l)) 6=0 , if
unobserved heterogeneity subsists in uik. However, based on Monte-Carlo simu-
lations, Bourguignon et al (2004) conclude that “selection bias correction based
on the multinomial logit model seems a reasonable alternative to multinomial
models when the focus is on estimating an outcome over selected populationsrather than on estimating the selection process itself. This seems even true
when the IIA hypothesis is severely at odds.” We are then conﬁdent that our
choice of the multinomial logit should not bias our results at this stage.
As shown by Lee (1983), to correct for the endogenous selection in the earn-
ings equations, it is possible to adapt the two steps method suggested by Heck-
man (1979) to the case of polychotomous choice models. His intuition is that
the dimension of the problem can be reduced by substituting the P selection
equations in (2) by the single condition that:
maxl(ui(j,l) − ui(j,k)) ≤ 0
in which costs are omitted for ease of exposition.
Then, transforming to normal the cumulative distribution function of the
maximum order statistic achieves the transformation of the P-dimensional joint
distribution of the earnings and selection equations error terms to one of a
bivariate normal distribution, in which the Heckman procedure can be applied.
However, as shown by Schmertmann (1994) and more recently by Dahl (2002)
and Bourguignon, Fournier & Gurgand (2004), Lee’s method implies very strong
restrictions on the correlation structure of the earnings and selection equations
disturbances and is only adapted to very small samples. Dahl (2002) suggests
a non parametric method that is less demanding and better adapted when a
large number of observations is available. The idea is to use the results of the
polychotomous choice model to compute, for each observation, a set of choice
probabilities, then to correct the earnings equation of endogenous selection by
adding a polynomial of these probabilities in the list of explanatory variables.In this paper we thus use Dahl’s correction method and Bourguignon et al.
(2004)’s Stata program to estimate our model and to get unbiased estimates of
the Mincer equations coeﬃcients, βk.
In order to recover the value of α in the structural model a ﬁnal step is
needed. Following Gourieroux and Monfort (1995), one possibility could be to
use a Minimum Distance Estimator, based on the set of constraints that have to
be satisﬁed by coeﬃcients of equations (1), (3) and (4) under the assumptions
of the structural model, that is:
c β
α
k − α.(b βk − b β0)=0for k =1to 6. (5)
where index 000 refers to the reference country in the reduced form multinomial












6)0 be the vector of estimated coef-
ﬁcients in the ﬁrst and second steps of the estimation. The constraints system
of equation can be written:
g(b θ,α)=0
and the Minimum Distance Estimator of α, b α,v e r i ﬁes:
b α =a r gm i n ( g(b θ, b α)0.Sn.g(b θ, b α))
with Sn an appropriately chosen weighting matrix. Unfortunately, this estima-
tor of α is likely to be biased if, because of the violation of the IIA assumption
in the reduced form model, the c β
α
k are themselves biased.
6In the multinomial logit model, only the diﬀerences βα
k − βα
0 , where 0 is the index of a
reference country, can be identiﬁed.The second possibility is to compute unconditional average earnings predic-
tions, for each individual in each possible location, using unbiased estimates of
βk and proceed to the estimation of the following structural conditional logit
model:









This will yield unbiased estimates of α under the assumptions of the structural
model.
4 Model identiﬁcation and choice of variables
In order to be identiﬁed, our model relies on various assumptions that need to
be properly tested. In particular, in the second step of our procedure in which
we correct for individuals’ self-selection, it is important to have one or more
variables that explain locational choice (i.e. that enter the ﬁrst stage equa-
tion) but do not inﬂuence earnings. In what follows, we use dummies indicating
whether the individual’s father did not go to school or was absent when she was
15, together with dummies for the individual’s religion and nationality as iden-
tifying variables.7 Religion is indeed likely to have an inﬂuence on destination
choice given that large diﬀerences exist between countries in their population’s
dominant religions. Nationality dummies are also included to account for macro-
level variables, such as average GDP per capita, mortality rates or the shares of
immigrants from ECOWAS countries in the country’s population. These vari-
7For some observations the father’s education is unobserved. In order to keep our sample
as large as possible, we chose to put 0 for the father’s education when it was missing and to
add a dummy that equals 1 in that case and 0 otherwise.ables also capture migration costs between the origin and destination countries.
There are of course reasons why any one of these exclusion restrictions could be
violated. For example, if there is discrimination against people of a particular
nationality or religion in a particular destination country, then these variables
would inﬂuence earnings. They could also inﬂuence earnings through aﬀecting
schooling diﬀerences, if people from diﬀerent countries with the same education
level receive diﬀerent quality of schooling. However, we believe discrimination
on the basis of nationality or religion to be second-order concerns within these
similar countries, and there is evidence suggesting that the quality of schooling
does not diﬀer dramatically across these countries. Indeed, according to Unesco
Education for All 2005 Monitoring Report which provides various indicators
measuring the quality of education, none of the seven countries under concern
stands out of the crowd. For instance, Benin ranks ﬁrst when the quality of
education is measured by the probability of being literate after 6 years of pri-
mary school, but ranks fourth and seventh when quality is measured by test
scores and the average teacher wage respectively. It could also be argued that
father’s education and father’s presence in household at age 15 are correlated
with household wealth, which aﬀects occupational choice and earnings. How-
ever, we run overidentiﬁcation tests that do not reject the null hypothesis of zero
correlation between our instruments and the principal equation error terms in
ﬁve out of seven countries.8
8Identiﬁcation then rests upon non linearity as the list of covariates in the selection equation
is the same as in the earnings equation. Under the null hypothesis, however, the coeﬃcients
of our instrumental variables are zero in the earnings equation, thus providing the necessary
exclusion restrictions to identify the model. Moreover, it is not absolutely necessary that the
list of covariates in the selection equation includes variables that do not appear in the earnings
equation (Wooldridge, 2000) . The diﬃculty comes from the fact that the control functions
in the selectivity corrected earnings function could be approximated by linear functions of
the explanatory variables, thus creating potential multicollinearity. In our case, neither the
estimated coeﬃcients, nor their standard errors, were signiﬁcantly modiﬁed when we addedIn the third stage of our procedure, identiﬁcation of the log-earnings coeﬃ-
cient, α, in the structural model of residential choice depends upon the exclusion
from equation (1) of at least one variable that enters in the log-earnings equa-
tion (3). Here we assume that sex, education and employment sector explain
log-hourly earnings but not residential choice, once earnings are accounted for.
There are some good reasons for which education could determine residential
choice, apart from its impact on potential earnings. One possibility is that well
educated individuals might prefer countries where the average level of educa-
tion is high, not only because their own wages are going to be higher, but also
because they will beneﬁt from positive externalities related to this high average
level of education (such as a higher supply of cultural goods for instance). In
our case, however, movers appear much less educated on average than stayers
both in origin and destination countries, so we believe this incentive to be low.
It could also be argued that people moving abroad experience a loss in utility
due to the remoteness of their home country, extended family and friends. This
could induce a direct eﬀect of the sex variable on locational choice, besides its
indirect eﬀect through earnings, if males (resp. females) experience a greater
loss than females (resp. males). However, it is not clear whether the diﬀerence
between sexes in this utility loss should be large, since both men and women
rely on family and friends networks. They may, as such, have quite similar
preferences to stay in their home country. Last, excluding the employment sec-
tor from the locational choice decision does not seem too heroic an assumption
given the strong similarities in the structure of urban labour markets (and in
the share of public vs. private and formal vs. informal jobs in particular) that
the father’s characteristics in the earnings equation.exist between the seven countries.
In the earnings equation our dependent variable is the logarithm of total
hourly earnings in CFA francs. All earnings are expressed in purchasing power
parity (PPP). The conversion to PPP CFA francs is necessary in the third step
of our estimation, where the individual’s expected earnings in the seven coun-
tries are allowed to inﬂuence the probability of choice. The PPP conversion
factors we use have been computed in 1998 by ASECNA and have been actu-
alized through 2001 using national inﬂation rates.9 Independent variables in
the earnings equations are sex, education (as measured by the last diploma ob-
tained), potential labour market experience and its square, the abilities to speak
french and another foreign language, two dummies for the public or private for-
mal sectors and a series of dummies for the father’s activity when the individual
was 15. This last set of variables is included both as a determinant of migration
behaviour and as a proxy for the individual’s sector choice, to account for the
earnings diﬀerentials between the diﬀerent sectors of the economy. The reduced
form multinomial logit model includes these variables, together with dummies
for the individual’s religion and nationality.
9A S E C N Ai st h eA g e n c ep o u rl aS é c u r i t éd el aN a v i g a t i o nA é r i e n n ee nA f r i q u ee tàM a d a -
gascar. This agency computed its own PPP conversion factors, based on prices observed in
the African capital cities, in order to give the same wage to its agents in terms of purchasing
power. Another possibility is to use the conversion factors published by the World Bank in
its World Development Indicators (World Bank 2003). However, we think ASECNA PPP is
preferable for our purpose, since it has been speciﬁcally designed to make comparisons between
capital cities.5 Estimation Results
5.1 Reduced form multinomial logit of residential choice
Estimation results are presented in Tables 8, 9 and 10. Table 8 shows the
results of the reduced form multinomial logit estimation. These are uneasy




0 can be identiﬁed, where 0
is the index of a reference country (Senegal in our case). Thus, for instance,
the positive coeﬃcient of the sex variable in the equation for Benin tells that
being a male increases relatively more the utility resulting from choosing Benin
than the utility resulting from choosing Senegal. However it does not mean
that being a male increases the utility associated with Benin in absolute terms,




0. The results suggest that, among the
seven countries under review, holding a post-graduate degree increases more
(or decreases less) the utility to reside in Senegal than that of residing in any
other country. By contrast, holding a baccalaureate degree increase the utility
of residing in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger or Togo much more than that
of residing in Senegal. The same holds true for people of muslim or catholic
confession. Unsurprisingly, we also ﬁnd that being of Senegalese nationality
increases much more the utility to reside in Senegal than that of residing in any
other country, with the exception of Mali, but the coeﬃcient is unsigniﬁcant
(results not shown).
5.2 Earnings equations
Following Dahl (2002), the estimated coeﬃcients of the reduced form multino-
mial logit have been used to compute, for each observation of the sample, apolynomial of choice probabilities that has been added to the set of explana-
tory variables in the earnings equation. Several speciﬁcations have been tried.
Theoretically, all but one destination probabilities could enter the correction
functions. However, in our sample, this led to multicollinearity problems in the
earnings equations so we had ﬁnally to retain a more restricted set of choice
probabilities, that includes: the ﬁrst best choice probability, that is the proba-
bility to reside in the actual residence country ; the retention probability, that
is the probability to reside in the country of citizenship and ﬁnally the highest
predicted probability, excluding the retention probability.10 We complete this
set of selection correction terms by adding the interactions between these prob-
abilities as explanatory variables. The resulting equations have been estimated
by OLS. Since our estimation strategy is a multi-step procedure, the entire
process has been bootstrapped with 50 replications and bootstrapped standard
errors have been used for hypothesis testing. Results are presented in Table
9. As the coeﬃcients of the polynomials of the selection probabilities have no
interpretation and because of space limitations, we limit the presentation to the
coeﬃcients of the variables that have a direct interpretation. The ﬁrst column
shows the estimated coeﬃcients when no correction for endogenous selection is
applied while the second column presents the corrected coeﬃcients. The results
of a series of Wald tests are also shown at the bottom of Table 9. Several test
statistics were computed. First, we test whether the selection correction terms
enter the earnings equation signiﬁcantly. Second, we test the hypothesis that
our excluded variables, that is the father, religion and nationality dummies,
10This follows a strategy suggested by Dahl (2002). In his application to USA data, after
testing several speciﬁcations, he ended up in using an even more restricted set of probabilities,
keeping just the ﬁrst best choice and the retention probabilities in the correction function.have no signiﬁcant contribution to the explanation of the dependent variable,
namely log-earnings.11
Looking ﬁr s ta tt h eo v e r i d e n t i ﬁcation tests, the results allow us to conclude
to the correct identiﬁcation of our model: albeit in the cases of Mali and Togo
and for the father dummies only, the Wald tests statistics are found to be in-
signiﬁcant, indicating that the vector of variables used to instrument residential
choice does not contribute to the determination of earnings, once the correction
terms are included. For Mali and Togo, we re-run the earnings regressions in-
cluding the father dummies as explanatory variables and checked that this did
not change signiﬁcantly the results.
As for the correction functions, we ﬁnd that for four countries, namely Benin,
Cote d’Ivoire, Mali and Togo, we can reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients
of the polynomials included to correct for endogenous selection are all zero,
suggesting that in these countries, holding account of migrants self selection
impacts the estimation of earnings equations in the capital. In none of the
cases, however, does adjusting for self-selection change the returns to educa-
tion enough that the adjusted coeﬃcients lie outside the conﬁdence intervals
for the unadjusted ones. This result suggests either that, given the relatively
small number of migrants in our samples, selection does not strongly bias the
estimated returns to education, or that our control functions do not do much
to correct for the type of selectivity that matters.
In Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Niger, corrected coeﬃcients are found lower than
uncorrected ones, suggesting that migrants to these countries share unobserved
characteristics that make their earnings higher than the host country average.
11All tests are based on bootstrapped standard errors.The opposite is found in Mali and Togo. Notice that this has no implication in
terms of migrants positive or negative selection. Indeed, even though migrants
to Mali appear to have lower than average earnings in their host country, it
could still be the case that their earnings in the host country are higher than
what it would be in their origin country. In order to check whether or not
earnings diﬀerentials matter in locational choice we need to estimate the model
in its structural form.
Comparing returns to education shows large diﬀerences between countries.
In Bamako, and to a lesser extent in Dakar, returns to education seem much
lower than in other capitals. The progression in returns between grades does not
appear very steep either (see ﬁgure 1). In Bamako, having completed primary
school yields an estimated increase in hourly earnings of only 23% compared to
uneducated individuals, a much lower estimate than what is found in Abidjan,
where the increase is estimated around 55%. In all countries, the highest returns
are found for the bachelor degree. The lowest value is found in Bamako (+114%
when compared to uneducated individuals) and the highest in Lome (+227%).
5.3 Structural model of residential choice
The last question we examine in this paper is whether earnings diﬀerentials
matter in locational choice. Results of the conditional logit estimation (equation
(6)) appear in Table 10a. We present the results obtained when no correction for
endogenous selection is applied, together with the corrected results. Obviously,
correcting for endogenous selection signiﬁcantly changes the coeﬃcient estimates
of log earnings in the structural model: with no correction, the coeﬃcient is
found small and weakly signiﬁcant. Its size more than doubles and becomes verysigniﬁcant when we correct for endogenous selection, bringing support to the
idea that individuals tend to locate in countries where their expected earnings
are higher.
A second assessment of this is given by the results of simulations that we
run to compare wages between origin and destination countries. Here is how we
proceed:
- Step 1: compute for each individual, the predicted value of its
average hourly income in each country: x0
ik.b βk.
- Step 2: for each individual, draw a value in the standard normal
distribution: b us
i
- Step 3: for each individual, i, and for each country, k, compute the
predited value of individual’s hourly income: x0
ik.b βk + b σk.b us
i, where
b σk is the estimated value of uik standard deviation in equation (3).
- Repeat steps 2 and 3 one hundred times.
- For “movers”, compute the number of times the individual is found
to live in a country, r, where its predicted hourly income is higher





ir.b βr+b σr.b us
i>x0
ic.b βc+b σc.b us
i
ª = mic
- For “stayers”, compute the average value of predicted hourly in-
comes in the countries where the individual did not choose to reside,
then compute the number of times the predicted value of hourly in-










ir.b βr+b σr.b us
i
ª = sicTable 10b shows the results of this exercise. For movers (resp. stayers) of
each country we report the proportion of individuals for which mic (resp. sic)i s
larger than 50. As we can see, for Benin, Burkina Faso and Mali our model does
a good job in predicting that movers live in a country where their hourly income
is higher than in their country of citizenship. Stayers are also well predicted in
Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and Senegal. However it fails to predict the destination
of movers from Senegal and Togo and of stayers in Benin. That the model fails to
predict the behavior of workers in some countries should not be surprising, since
potential income diﬀerentials are certainly not the only motive for migration. In
a sense the model’s relative ability to predict workers’ choice based on potential
income diﬀerentials is a surprisingly good result. In Mali in particular, incomes
diﬀerentials seem to play an important role.
In the same vein, we computed, for movers, the diﬀerence between the pre-
dicted value of hourly earnings in the origin country and that of hourly earnings
in the destination country and, for stayers, the diﬀerence between the predicted
value of hourly earnings in the origin country and an average of the predicted
value of hourly earnings that could be obtained in the six potential destination
countries. Then, separately for movers and stayers, we computed the average
value of these diﬀerences. The diﬀerence is close to zero for stayers (-0.36),
suggesting that for these people there is no real gain of moving abroad whereas,
for movers, the gain appears substantial and signiﬁcant (-3.99), meaning much
higher hourly earnings abroad than in the origin country.5.4 Robustness checks.
Several robustness checks have been done. First, in the second stage of our
estimation procedure we run a Heckman selection model using data on partic-
ipants and non-participants to the labour market, instead of running an OLS
regression on participants only. Indeed, in the foregoing estimations, due to the
diﬃculty of controlling both for the endogenous selection of locational choice
and for labour force participation, our sample was restricted to labour market
participants. This limitation is naturally a potential source of bias in our es-
timates. The identifying variable in the Heckman selection model is marital
status (i.e. whether the individual is married or not), which is assumed to inﬂu-
ence labor market participation but not earnings. Results obtained in the third
stage were not aﬀected by this change, suggesting negligible biases.
Second, we checked whether self-selected internal migration aﬀected the ob-
served returns to education but found no evidence of a selection bias.
Last, since our results might depend upon the set of conversion factors used
to convert current CFA francs to PPP, we re-run our model using the World
Bank set of conversion factors (World Bank 2003). Once again, this modiﬁcation
did not change our results signiﬁcantly.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we use a unique set of identical labour force surveys that allow to
observe at the same time migrants in seven WAEMU countries and their country
of origin’s labour market. We use these data ﬁrst to document the patterns
of migration ﬂows in the sub-region, second to estimate the determinants ofmigration behaviour across these countries and to correct the estimated returns
to education for the endogeneity of locational choice. We ﬁnally estimate a
structural model to evaluate the impact of expected earnings diﬀerentials on
the probability of selecting a particular country to reside in.
Our results show that, despite the severe political crisis that started in
1999, Cote d’Ivoire remains the most important immigration country in the
sub-region. Our data also suggests that Mali and Burkina Faso have been and
still are major labour-exporting countries, largely towards Cote d’Ivoire. Benin
and Togo, by contrast, combine both emigration and immigration. Looking at
migrants characteristics we ﬁnd that migrants tend to be less educated than
non migrants in both their origin and destination country. Thus cross-border
migration within the sub-region seems to concern mainly low educated individ-
uals. They are more likely than natives to work in the informal sector and they
receive lower wages.
Our econometric results suggest that not holding account of international
migration in estimating returns to education yields upward biased estimates in
three countries out of seven and downward biased estimates in two others. How-
ever, disparities in returns to education between capital cities do not vanish,
suggesting that country-speciﬁc amenities and other unmeasurable non-wage
variables play important roles in the locational choice of individuals with diﬀer-
ent levels of education. We also ﬁnd that expected earnings diﬀerentials have a
very signiﬁcant eﬀect on the choice probabilities of our sample individuals: all
else equal, they tend to live in cities in which their expected earnings are higher
than elsewhere. Of course, the sample we use is not a random sample of indi-
viduals from the WAEMU region as a whole and the destinations we considerare not the whole universe of potential destinations. Still, while development
economics is full of examples of apparently irrational behavior, our results on
the locational choice of a large sample of West Africans suggest that individu-
als in developing countries do not always deviate from the standard economic
model.
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Appendix: 1-2-3 Surveys Sampling Method
The sample of surveyed households in each capital city is a stratiﬁed one.
Census sectors were ﬁrst randomly selected based on last population censuses
and households were then randomly selected from a door-to-door listing within
each census block. In each capital city, 125 census sectors and 20 households in
each census sector were selected (except for Cotonou were 24 households instead
of 20 were selected). The total number of census sectors varies between capital
cities: 464 in Cotonou, 713 in Ouagadougou, 2,483 in Abidjan, 993 in Bamako,






Mali Niger Senegal Togo Other n.d.
Benin (Cotonou) - 3 6 15 58 3 102 138 18 343 6 994 7 337
of which WAEMU nationals
(*) - 3 6 15 55 2 100 38 16 235
Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou) 11 - 7821 1 6 1 8 1 1 74 8 198 8 251
of which WAEMU nationals 6 - 7701 1 6 57 49
Cote d'Ivoire (Abidjan) 53 446 - 256 90 72 87 310 133 1447 5 974 7 416
of which WAEMU nationals 52 428 - 231 85 65 79 120 124 1184
Mali (Bamako) 8 14 11 - 8 12 0 62 8 123 7 148 7 272
of which WAEMU nationals 31 3 1 0- 61 1036 6 85
Niger (Niamey) 76 49 4 122 - 5 5 95 22 6 393 7 710 8 106
of which WAEMU nationals 67 49 4 119 - 54 8 27 23 342
Senegal (Dakar) 11 0290- 4 130 53 209 11 773 11 977
of which WAEMU nationals 70290 - 1 74 35 128
Togo (Lome) 88 9 9 11 50 3 - 113 23 306 5 927 6 254
of which WAEMU nationals 87 9 8 11 44 3 - 24 21 207
Total 247 521 39 421 208 96 268 823 272
of which WAEMU nationals 222 502 37 392 190 87 244 324 232
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1st round, 2001-2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL. Authors' computations.
having the country's citizenship or not. In bold are all sample individuals who will be considered in the analysis.
(*) Within the sample of immigrants coming from one of the six WAEMU countries, some individuals are not WAEMU nationals (Exemple: A French 
national who spent 10 years in Burkina Faso before moving to Benin is recorded as an immigrant coming from Burkina Faso but is not Burkinabe).
Number of sample individuals coming from: Total 
sample size






nativesTable 2 - (Weighted) share of immigrants among urban residents by WAEMU country (%)
Bénin Burkina Côte d'Ivoire Mali Niger Sénégal Togo
Natives 96,4 99,3 84,1 98,4 95,6 98,5 95,5
Immigrants 3,6 0,7 15,9 1,6 4,4 1,6 4,5
of which:
coming from WAEMU 60,6 70,7 73,5 43,8 85,7 13,0 60,7
coming from other developing countries 36,4 23,9 25,2 43,4 12,2 83,9 38,8
coming from developed countries 3,1 6,2 1,3 12,6 2,2 3,1 0,8
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1st round, 2001-2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL. Authors' computations.Table 3 - Composition of migrants' stocks at the national level, by WAEMU country
Benin Burkina Faso Cote d'Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo Total
Benin - 4,7 20,0 5,1 25,3 0,4 44,5 100,0 57  971
Burkina Faso 10,2 - 4,9 61,1 19,3 1,9 2,7 100,0 717 271
Cote d'Ivoire 3,7 58,8 - 29,3 7,8 0,2 0,1 100,0 1 661 157
Mali 18,8 49,4 3,2 - 17,8 4,5 6,3 100,0 22 529
Niger 15,9 17,1 7,8 55,3 - 1,3 2,5 100,0 60  922
Senegal 4,8 12,2 1,0 76,1 4,4 - 1,5 100,0 31  077
Togo 77,8 0,8 0,1 2,9 18,1 0,3 - 100,0 92  234
Total number of emigrants 221 362 1 006 194 52 335 987 480 305 471 20 198 50 121 2 643 161
Source: Census data, circ. 2000.
Total number of 
immigrants
Number of individuals coming from… as a share of totalTable 4 - Mean characteristics of natives and immigrants by country of residence
Natives Natives Natives Natives Natives Natives Natives
% of males 48,2 42,5 50,7 54,1 47,6 61,5 * 49,1 51,1 48,6 43,5 47,1 47,4 47,6 56,2 *
Age in years 31,1 30,8 30,2 30,4 29,0 34,6 * 31,2 30,4 30,7 33,9 * 30,9 33,9 30,4 30,9
Education and experience
Experience in years 18,5 21,3 19,1 18,7 16,4 26,6 * 20,3 18,1 19,6 25,5 * 19,5 19,4 17,7 20,4 *
Years of schooling 6,6 3,6 * 5,1 5,7 6,6 2,0 * 4,8 5,8 5,1 2,3 * 5,3 8,6 * 6,6 4,5 *
% with no diploma 45,8 72,4 * 54,3 54,1 44,7 83,5 * 58,4 55,8 60,9 81,5 * 60,2 31,6 * 42,8 63,0 *
% with completed primary education 26,7 14,9 * 24,6 13,5 27,6 10,2 * 19,2 16,3 20,3 11,6 * 18,5 15,8 31,9 24,7 *
% with BEPC 13,2 6,1 * 11,3 18,9 10,4 2,7 * 8,1 4,7 7,2 2,4 * 11,0 21,1 14,7 5,6 *
% with baccalaureat 4,0 3,9 1,6 0,0 4,8 0,6 * 2,2 7,0 * 2,6 0,0 * 3,8 5,3 3,2 1,2
Can read&write in French 71,6 37,0 * 59,6 64,9 73,8 28,5 * 49,2 51,2 56,5 29,8 * 60,4 73,7 73,7 53,7 *
Can read&write in a foreign language 24,5 26,5 13,3 24,3 * 25,0 10,9 * 12,2 34,9 * 21,6 18,2 19,3 47,4 * 27,1 22,2
Religion
% of muslim 9,9 47,0 * 55,8 37,8 * 31,2 73,3 * 97,2 79,1 * 98,2 76,4 * 93,3 57,9 * 9,6 45,7 *
% of catholic 67,2 31,5 * 36,2 18,9 * 35,9 17,8 * 1,8 18,6 * 1,2 19,5 * 6,6 42,1 * 47,6 24,7 *
% of protestant 5,2 3,9 6,5 27,0 * 10,7 3,4 * 0,5 2,3 0,4 3,4 * 0,1 0,0 10,2 0,6 *
Number of observations 6 994 181 8 198 37 5 974 940 7 148 43 7 710 292 11 773 19 5 927 162
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1st round, 2001-2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL. Authors' computations.
A "*" means that the difference is statistically significant
Niger Senegal Togo Benin Burkina Faso Cote d'Ivoire Mali
Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants Immigrants ImmigrantsTable 5 - Mean characteristics of natives and emigrants by country of residence
Natives Natives Natives Natives Natives Emigrants Natives Natives
% of males 48,2 44,6 50,7 58,4 * 47,6 54,1 49,1 57,4 * 48,6 67,9 * 47,1 71,2 * 47,6 38,5 *
Age in years 31,1 32,8 * 30,2 34,7 * 29,0 27,9 31,2 34,9 * 30,7 31,7 30,9 37,4 * 30,4 30,2
Education and experience
Experience in years 18,5 21,5 * 19,1 27,0 * 16,4 15,4 20,3 27,7 * 19,6 23,4 * 19,5 26,9 * 17,7 20,0 *
Years of schooling 6,6 5,3 * 5,1 1,8 * 6,6 6,5 4,8 1,2 * 5,1 2,3 * 5,3 4,1 * 6,6 4,2 *
% with no diploma 45,8 55,9 * 54,3 86,5 * 44,7 43,2 58,4 90,3 * 60,9 81,6 * 60,2 65,5 42,8 67,2 *
% with completed primary education 26,7 23,4 24,6 9,0 * 27,6 21,6 19,2 6,4 * 20,3 11,6 * 18,5 14,9 31,9 19,3 *
% with BEPC 13,2 8,6 * 11,3 2,2 * 10,4 8,1 8,1 1,0 * 7,2 2,6 * 11,0 6,9 14,7 7,0 *
% with baccalaureat 4,0 0,9 * 1,6 0,4 * 4,8 8,1 2,2 0,3 * 2,6 1,1 3,8 6,9 3,2 0,8 *
Can read&write in French 71,6 57,2 * 59,6 27,9 * 73,8 64,9 49,2 16,1 * 56,5 27,9 * 60,4 51,7 73,7 48,0 *
Can read&write in a foreign language 24,5 18,9 13,3 8,2 * 25,0 37,8 * 12,2 13,3 21,6 31,9 * 19,3 21,8 27,1 18 *
Religion
% of muslim 9,9 25,2 * 55,8 69,5 * 31,2 51,4 * 97,2 99,2 * 98,2 96,3 93,3 86,2 * 9,6 24,2 *
% of catholic 67,2 38,7 * 36,2 26,1 * 35,9 16,2 * 1,8 0,3 * 1,2 1,6 6,6 10,3 47,6 44,3
% of protestant 5,2 6,8 6,5 2,2 * 10,7 2,7 0,5 0,5 0,4 0,5 0,1 1,1 * 10,2 12,3
Number of observations 6 994 222 8 198 502 5 974 37 7 148 392 7 710 190 11 773 87 5 927 244
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1st round, 2001-2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL. Authors' computations.
A "*" means that the difference is statistically significant
Emigrants Emigrants
Togo Senegal Niger Mali
Emigrants Emigrants Emigrants Emigrants






Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Benin (Cotonou) 6,6 4,7 10,8 1,9 2,6 13,0 3,8 3,6
Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou) 8,7 5,0 5,6 2,4 na 10,0 5,9 5,7
Côte d'Ivoire (Abidjan) 6,5 1,5 6,6 1,1 1,0 3,6 4,2 2,0
Mali (Bamako) 13,0 4,6 1,5 4,7 13,0 5,3 na 5,8
Niger (Niamey) 3,5 2,6 4,0 0,8 5,0 1,5 4,2 2,3
Senegal (Dakar) 11,7 na 15,5 3,9 na 5,2 15,0 8,6
Togo (Lome) 5,0 3,8 9,5 2,5 3,1 7,7 6,6 4,5
All emigrants 5,3 1,8 6,5 1,2 2,3 4,1 4,2
Notes: in bold are figures computed on samples exceeding 30 observations. 
In grey are figures computed on nonmigrant natives.






Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Benin (Cotonou) 48,4 33,3 66,7 53,3 65,5 50,0 27,0 42,5
Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou) 66,7 51,0 42,9 42,9 na 100,0 56,3 54,1
Côte d'Ivoire (Abidjan) 53,8 59,8 48,1 60,2 72,9 73,8 54,4 61,3
Mali (Bamako) 66,7 38,5 60,0 49,7 50,0 54,5 na 51,2
Niger (Niamey) 29,8 53,1 25,0 52,1 48,8 60,0 31,3 43,5
Senegal (Dakar) 42,9 na 50,0 55,6 na 47,3 0,0 47,4
Togo (Lome) 48,3 55,6 62,5 72,7 63,6 100,0 47,7 56,2
All emigrants 44,6 58,4 54,1 57,4 67,9 71,3 38,5
Notes: in bold are figures computed on samples exceeding 30 observations. 
In grey are figures computed on nonmigrant natives.






Mali Niger Senegal Togo
Benin (Cotonou) 30,2 33,3 0,0 46,7 23,6 0,0 62,0 45,9
Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou) 0,0 31,2 42,9 57,1 na 0,0 37,5 35,1
Côte d'Ivoire (Abidjan) 26,9 37,6 30,0 39,0 25,9 16,9 32,9 34,5
Mali (Bamako) 0,0 38,5 30,0 34,3 0,0 18,2 na 23,3
Niger (Niamey) 64,2 38,8 75,0 45,4 34,2 20,0 58,3 50,7
Senegal (Dakar) 0,0 na 0,0 33,3 na 35,7 0,0 15,8
Togo (Lome) 37,9 33,3 0,0 27,3 27,3 0,0 30,7 31,5
All emigrants 40,5 37,6 24,3 41,1 24,7 16,1 50,0
Notes: in bold are figures computed on samples exceeding 30 observations. 
In grey are figures computed on nonmigrant natives.
Percentage of uneducated females among individuals coming  All 
immigrants
Mean education level (in years) of individuals coming from: All 
immigrants
Percentage of males among individuals coming from: All 
immigrantsTable 7 - Employment situation of natives and immigrants, by country of residence
Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants
Employment situation
% of employed 68,0 71,3 56,6 56,8 59,7 77,9 57,5 58,1 47,5 65,7 50,4 57,9 70,6 74,7
% of unemployed 4,1 2,2 11,0 16,2 11,4 4,7 4,2 2,3 7,9 3,8 7,5 0,0 6,7 3,7
% of inactive 27,9 26,5 32,3 27,0 28,8 17,5 38,4 39,5 44,6 30,5 42,1 42,1 22,6 21,6
Number of observations 6 994 181 8 198 37 5 974 940 7 148 43 7 710 292 11 773 19 5 927 162
Sector of activity & wage of the employed
% in the public sector 8,8 0,0 13,9 9,5 8,4 1,0 11,5 4,0 17,9 1,0 9,0 0,0 8,1 1,7
% in the formal private sector 11,6 10,9 9,0 19,1 21,4 12,7 11,7 8,0 13,6 10,4 17,6 36,4 8,2 12,4
% in the informal private sector 79,5 89,1 77,1 71,4 70,2 86,3 76,8 88,0 68,5 88,6 73,4 63,6 83,8 86,0
Hourly wage in PPP CFA Francs 255 182 271 240 467 276 347 578 337 234 417 754 192 255
Number of observations 4 759 129 4 642 21 3 569 732 4 107 25 3 664 192 5 935 11 4 186 121
Source: 1-2-3 Surveys, 1st round, 2001-2003, National Statistical Institutes, AFRISTAT and DIAL. Authors' computations.













Lome       
(Togo)
Sex (1: Male) 0.97*** 0.76** 1.35*** 0.20 0.34 1.14***
(0.33) (0.31) (0.29) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33)
CEP (Primary school completed) -0.67 0.43 -0.20 -0.04 -0.35 -0.12
(0.50) (0.49) (0.45) (0.51) (0.50) (0.49)
BEPC (GCSE) -1.06 0.87 -0.25 0.01 -0.79 -0.49
(0.65) (0.67) (0.58) (0.71) (0.67) (0.65)
CAP -1.03 1.73 0.60 1.77 0.08 -1.04
(1.17) (1.19) (1.07) (1.19) (1.19) (1.16)
BEP -3.20 1.09 -1.05 0.52 -0.81 -0.24
(2.06) (2.09) (1.95) (1.91) (1.99) (2.00)
Baccalaureate 1.24 2.32*** 1.10* 1.35 1.37* 1.60**
(0.80) (0.89) (0.60) (0.88) (0.79) (0.77)
Foundation degree -2.62 1.07 -0.43 0.21 -0.86 -1.49
(1.82) (1.91) (1.77) (1.84) (1.85) (1.84)
Bachelor's degree -1.53 0.84 -0.43 0.51 -0.07 -1.20
(1.00) (1.03) (0.92) (1.00) (0.99) (1.00)
Postgraduate degree -5.51*** -4.01*** -4.88*** -3.85*** -3.99*** -5.45***
(1.02) (1.17) (1.06) (1.07) (1.06) (1.07)
Marital status (1: Married) -0.34 -0.65** -0.83*** -0.08 -0.42 -0.45
(0.35) (0.33) (0.30) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34)
Speaks French (1=Yes) -0.16 -0.08 -0.29 -0.05 0.22 0.22
(0.40) (0.37) (0.34) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
Speaks another Foreign Language (1=Yes) 1.19*** 0.07 0.20 -0.08 0.23 1.06***
(0.41) (0.41) (0.35) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41)
Experience (in years) 0.04 0.03 0.16*** -0.04 0.08* 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Experience Squared -0.00 -0.00 -0.002*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Public sector -0.18 0.52 -1.60*** 0.26 -0.16 -0.29
(0.63) (0.66) (0.59) (0.63) (0.62) (0.62)
Private sector 0.14 -0.84** -0.17 0.28 0.19 -0.24
(0.42) (0.38) (0.35) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41)
Father in the agricultural sector 0.12 -0.07 0.72** -0.41 -0.02 0.20
(0.39) (0.38) (0.35) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39)
Father in the industrial sector -0.85 -0.80 -0.05 -0.52 -0.40 -0.68
(0.60) (0.62) (0.52) (0.60) (0.60) (0.60)
Father in the commercial sector 0.81 1.20*** 1.38*** 0.97** 0.63 1.15**
(0.43) (0.41) (0.35) (0.42) (0.41) (0.43)
Father was a top executive 0.34 1.99** 1.20** 1.27* 1.07 0.67
(0.72) (0.79) (0.59) (0.73) (0.73) (0.72)
Father was a middle executive 0.48 0.22 0.02 0.61 0.61 -0.08
(0.64) (0.66) (0.58) (0.65) (0.64) (0.63)
Father was absent at age 15 1.47*** 0.35 1.01** 0.69 0.63 1.14**
(0.54) (0.53) (0.48) (0.53) (0.53) (0.54)
Father never went to school -0.56 0.31 -0.59* -0.69* 0.10 -0.91**
(0.37) (0.37) (0.34) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37)
Father schooling is missing -7.09*** -3.72*** -4.62*** -2.79*** -3.05*** -3.75***
(0.77) (0.69) (0.65) (0.65) (0.68) (0.70)
Muslim -6.00*** -5.55*** -5.74*** -5.72*** -3.18* -6.88***
(1.80) (1.82) (1.78) (1.84) (1.84) (1.79)
Catholic -4.15** -4.57** -4.97*** -4.97** -3.20* -5.37***
(1.82) (1.84) (1.80) (1.88) (1.86) (1.81)
Protestant -2.47 -0.92 -1.93 -2.65 -0.83 -3.39
(2.17) (2.19) (2.15) (2.25) (2.22) (2.16)
Nationality dummies
Intercept -3.98*** -4.83** -1.62 -0.92 -6.01*** -2.35***
(2.21) (2.23) (1.94) (2.03) (2.10) (2.03)
Observations 31 647 31 647 31 647 31 647 31 647 31 647
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable takes value 1 (Benin) to 7 (Togo), with category 6 (Senegal) used as the comparison category. 
Included but not shownTable 9 - OLS Log-earnings Regression: uncorrected (1st column) and corrected (2nd column) estimates (selected results)
Sex (1: Male) 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.31*** 0.40*** 0.44*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.28*** -0.15*** -0.18*** 0.31*** 0.28***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
CEP (Primary school completed) 0.54*** 0.50*** 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.21*** 0.23** 0.52*** 0.53*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.52*** 0.52***
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
BEPC (GCSE) 1.00*** 0.94*** 1.31*** 1.30*** 1.17*** 1.19*** 0.53*** 0.56*** 1.07*** 1.08*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 1.11*** 1.13***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
CAP 1.17*** 1.07*** 1.18*** 1.19*** 1.21*** 1.19*** 0.48*** 0.54*** 1.48*** 1.42*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 1.10*** 1.24***
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) (0.23) (0.18) (0.25) (0.14) (0.23) (0.21)
BEP 0.95** 0.74** 1.74*** 1.76*** 1.13*** 1.03*** 0.98*** 1.03*** 1.30*** 1.22*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 1.34*** 1.31***
(0.47) (0.35) (0.25) (0.25) (0.20) (0.14) (0.11) (0.12) (0.20) (0.20) (0.26) (0.20) (0.24) (0.18)
Baccalaureate 1.37*** 1.35*** 1.85*** 1.86*** 1.71*** 1.66*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 1.90*** 1.90*** 0.97*** 1.05*** 1.64*** 1.63***
(0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.11) (0.20) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.16)
Foundation degree
(a) 2.14*** 1.94*** 2.14*** 2.10*** 2.08*** 2.08*** 1.00*** 1.06*** 1.90*** 1.82*** 1.17*** 1.14*** 2.72*** 2.74***
(0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.24) (0.15) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) (0.25) (0.22) (0.26) (0.22) (0.28) (0.19)
Bachelor's degree 1.98*** 1.89*** 2.41*** 2.41*** 2.30*** 2.26*** 1.42*** 1.49*** 2.26*** 2.16*** 1.40*** 1.39*** 2.53*** 2.58***
(0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.16) (0.13)
Postgraduate degree 1.74*** 1.61*** 1.62*** 1.65*** 1.81*** 1.73*** 1.15*** 1.14*** 1.98*** 1.89*** 1.39*** 1.36*** 2.20*** 2.27***
(0.18) (0.17) (0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23) (0.22) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18) (0.13) (0.27) (0.21)
Marital status (1: Married) 0.65*** 0.63*** 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.28*** 0.25*** 0.43*** 0.47*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.48*** 0.49***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Speaks French (1: Yes) 0.14** 0.15* 0.40*** 0.45*** 0.06 0.06 0.21*** 0.21** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.08 0.07
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Speaks a foreign language (1: Yes) 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.19** 0.17*** 0.13** 0.08 0.09 0.17* 0.34*** 0.35*** 0.04 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
Experience (in years) 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Experience squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Public sector 0.27*** 0.32*** 0.66*** 0.76*** 0.69*** 0.50*** 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.49*** 0.46*** 0.78*** 0.84*** 0.64*** 0.65***
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06)
Private sector 0.32*** 0.34*** 0.42*** 0.47*** 0.67*** 0.65*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.81*** 0.83*** 0.33*** 0.33***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
Father in the agricultural sector -0.02 -0.06 -0.21*** -0.29*** -0.08 -0.05 -0.11** -0.18*** -0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Father in the industrial sector 0.15 0.10 -0.32** -0.37* -0.22** -0.19** -0.06 -0.06 -0.19 -0.21 -0.11 -0.12 -0.04 -0.02
(0.09) (0.12) (0.16) (0.19) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.21) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.13)
Father in the commercial sector 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.10* 0.11* -0.13 -0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.10 0.08
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12)
Father was a top executive 0.28** 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.35** 0.35** 0.41*** 0.43*** -0.20 -0.23 0.26** 0.27** 0.17 0.18
(0.12) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.11) (0.16) (0.24) (0.13) (0.13) (0.16) (0.18)
Father was a middle executive 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.09 0.12 -0.12 -0.18* 0.15** 0.17*** -0.05 -0.07 0.09 0.10 -0.01 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Observations 4 736 4 736 4 471 4 471 4 239 4 239 4 052 4 052 3 701 3 701 5 430 5 430 4 245 4 245
R-squared 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.32 0.32 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35
Wald test for selection correction 
terms 17.3*** 6.02 10.6* 11.0* 6.49 5.54 28.0***
Over-identification Wald Tests
-Father dummies
(b) 1.64 1.63 3.86 8.07** 2.03 1.05 10.1**
- Religion dummies 3.41 0.59 3.22 0.33 1.70 0.90 3.44
- Nationality dummies 4.61 7.72 5.48 2.45 7.60 0.02 7.17
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
(a) These countries' university system derives from the French system, in which, until recently, second-year students could get a diploma. We refer to it as the "foundation" degree.
(b): Father was absent when individual was 15 ; father has no schooling ; father schooling is missing.
Niamey (Niger) Dakar (Senegal) Lome (Togo) Cotonou (Benin) Ouagadougou (B. Faso) Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) Bamako (Mali)Table 10a – Individual residential choice: structural model estimates





Table 10b - Model simulation results
% of movers with mic > 50 % of stayers with sic > 50
Country
Benin 85 1
Burkina Faso 90 24
Ivory Coast 50 59
Mali 81 63
Niger 23 83
Senegal 7 68
Togo 6 31
Uncorrected model
Corrected model